The choice of invoicing currency for trade is crucial for the international transmission of macroeconomic policy. This paper develops a three-country model that endogenizes the choice of invoicing currency and that allows for a share of …rms'costs to be denominated in foreign currency, consistent with the empirical evidence on the high degree of pass-through to import prices. Invoicing decisions are driven by …rms'desire to hedge costs but also by exchange rate volatility and currency comovements. The model is tested empirically with a data set that spans ten currencies and 24 reporting countries, con…rming the importance of currency comovements for the decision to invoice in vehicle currency. The …ndings also imply that if the U.S. share of world output continues to fall, other currencies will increasingly replace the U.S. dollar as an international vehicle currency.
Introduction
The choice of invoicing currency in international trade is crucial for the international transmission of macroeconomic policy. For example, Betts and Devereux (2000) demonstrate that the e¤ects of monetary and …scal policy on consumption and welfare can be radically di¤erent, depending on which currency is used for invoicing. But how do …rms choose an invoicing currency for international trade? Clearly, an exogenous assumption about the invoicing currency is not satisfactory. This paper endogenizes the choice of invoicing currency in a three-country model of monopolistic competition in which …rms preset prices under exchange rate risk. They can either invoice in producer currency, in local currency or in a third vehicle currency and endogenously choose the currency that maximizes their expected pro…ts. A key feature of the model is that …rms may face a share of their production costs denominated in foreign currency, a feature which is motivated by empirical evidence showing that the pass-through of nominal exchange rates is considerably higher to import and wholesale prices than to consumer prices. One can think of oil as an anecdotal example. Since oil is traditionally priced in U.S. dollars, from the perspective of non-U.S. …rms it counts as an input denominated in foreign currency. The model gives rise to a forthright hedging intuition in that …rms have an incentive to invoice in a particular currency if they face a large share of their costs in that currency.
But apart from the hedging intuition, the optimal choice of invoicing currency is also driven by exchange rate properties. In particular, if a certain currency is relatively volatile, …rms tend to invoice in other, more stable currencies in order to circumvent unnecessary exchange rate risk. Exchange rate correlations also play an important role. If a third currency is highly correlated with the vehicle currency, …rms have an increased incentive to invoice in vehicle currency because the high correlation adds to the momentum of the vehicle currency. The model is partial equilibrium but the same invoicing decisions would emerge in a general equilibrium framework because as monopolistic competitors, …rms take aggregate variables as given when making their invoicing decisions.
The essential building block that …rms'costs are partially denominated in foreign currency o¤ers an explanation for the special role that the U.S. plays whenever it is involved in international trade. The majority of trade involving the U.S. either as an exporter or importer is heavily priced in U.S. dollars to a degree that is unparalleled by other countries and their respective currencies. The model provides an intuitive explanation in that pricing in U.S. dollars is optimal both for exporters from and importers to the U.S.
because it allows the …rms involved to hedge their costs.
In addition, the model's predictions are tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that includes 24 reporting countries and ten invoicing currencies. A theoretical criterion based on the model is used to distinguish vehicle currency pricing from local currency pricing and the econometric speci…cations are closely intertwined with the model. The …ndings con…rm the importance of currency correlations for the decision to invoice in vehicle currency. They also imply that if the U.S. share of world output continues to fall, other currencies will increasingly replace the U.S. dollar as an international vehicle currency.
Empirical data on currency invoicing are still hard to …nd. Goldberg and Tille (2005) give an excellent overview of data availability. In addition, the European Central Bank (2005) has recently collected a number of invoicing observations on the euro which are analyzed by Kamps (2005) . A number of authors explore other country-speci…c invoicing data. Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) examine Canadian invoicing. Oi, Otani and Shirota (2004) examine Japanese invoicing and Goldberg (2005) analyzes the invoicing of Eastern European EU accession countries. Wilander (2005) uses a multinomial logit model to explain the choice of invoicing currency by Swedish exporters. Goldberg and Tille (2005) focus on industry-speci…c characteristics such as demand elasticities and exporters'market shares but their sample is considerably smaller.
The theoretical invoicing literature is surveyed by Oi, Otani and Shirota (2004) who provide a detailed discussion of models that endogenize the choice of invoicing currency.
Another review of the literature is presented by the European Central Bank (2005) . A recent theoretical contribution has been made by Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) .
Their general equilibrium framework predicts that exporters wish to invoice in the currency of the country with the more stable monetary policy. This prediction is related to the intuition about exchange rate volatility that arises in the present paper. But as monetary policy is equally stable in most industrial countries, this result in isolation might be more suitable for comparing …rms'invoicing behavior across poor and rich countries.
Furthermore, their two-country model does not allow for the possibility of vehicle currency pricing and therefore, no statement can be made about the role of exchange rate correlations. Friberg (1998) develops a three-country partial equilibrium model in which a monopolist faces costs in domestic currency. The exchange rates, however, are assumed to be uncorrelated. Goldberg and Tille (2005) also present a three-country model with the possibility of vehicle currency pricing. Their hedging mechanism arises through the assumption of decreasing returns to scale in production and ‡uctuating marginal costs. By allowing some of …rms'costs to be denominated in foreign currency and by explicitly incorporating currency comovements, the present model develops a richer hedging intuition that can also account for the prevalence of U.S. dollar invoicing.
Both Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) and Goldberg and Tille (2005) suggest models where industry-speci…c features matter. But industry-speci…c invoicing data are hardly available and hence, their models are di¢ cult to test. The predictions of the present model, however, are independent of industry-speci…c characteristics and therefore particularly suitable for testing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model with the key feature that some costs are denominated in foreign currency, giving rise to the volatility and hedging intuitions. Section 3 proceeds to test this theory empirically, making use of a comprehensive data set and analyzing both vehicle currency pricing and local currency pricing. Section 4 discusses the special role of the U.S. dollar and highlights questions for future research. Section 5 concludes.
A Model of Endogenous Currency Invoicing
The continuum [0; 1] is the range of all tradable goods in the world, each produced by one individual …rm. There are three countries in the model denoted by k, l and m. Country k produces the tradable goods range and comprises the …rm range [0; n k ], country l is in the range [n k ; n l ] and country m in [n l ; n m ] with n m = 1.
Consumers
Each country-j consumer maximizes a standard Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index de…ned over all tradable goods as
where c ij denotes the consumption of good i for a country-j consumer and T indicates tradable goods. The parameter > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and it is assumed to be the same across countries. The price index, de…ned as the minimum expenditure for one unit of C T j , can be derived from (1) as
where p ij denotes the price of the good c ij . The demand function for good c ij follows as
Firms
A key element of the model is the assumption that …rms face production costs that are not solely denominated in domestic currency but partly in foreign currency. The literature so far has assumed that inputs are only denominated in domestic currency, for instance Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) .
As an anecdotal example one can think of oil, which is a crucial input factor for many industries and which is traditionally priced in U.S. dollars and thus in foreign currency from the perspective of non-U.S. …rms. 1 Similarly, a vast range of raw materials and other standardized commodities such as certain chemical products are usually priced in U.S.
dollars. Goldberg and Tille (2005) adopt the distinction devised by James Rauch (1999) of reference priced goods and goods traded on an organized exchange versus di¤erentiated goods. They …nd that the former types of goods are priced considerably less in domestic (non-U.S. dollar) currencies than di¤erentiated goods. 2
Furthermore, the assumption that …rms face a part of their costs in foreign currency is motivated by comprehensive empirical evidence showing that the degree of pass-through to import and wholesale prices is considerably higher than the degree of pass-through to consumer prices. This phenomenon is documented, for instance, by McCarthy (2000) and Campa and Goldberg (2005) . 3
Production
All …rms within one country are assumed to be symmetric and the …rm-speci…c subscript i will therefore be dropped. A country-j …rm uses the Cobb-Douglas production technology
where Y T j is tradable output produced by a country-j …rm. N j;k , N j;l and N j;m denote input factors that originate from countries k, l and m, respectively, with j;k , j;l and j;m being their weights in the production process. Thus, N j;j represents domestic input factors.
The technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale so that j;k + j;l + j;m = 1.
It is furthermore assumed that all inputs are denominated in the currency of the country of origin. Let R h denote the h-currency price of the input factors from country h for all h = k; l; m. De…ne the nominal exchange rate e j;h as the j-currency price of h-currency and e h;j as its inverse with e j;j = 1 for all j = k; l; m and h = k; l; m. Given this notation the cost function that is associated with production function (3) and that is denominated in j-currency can be written as
The technical appendix shows that when …rms minimize costs, cost function (4) can be expressed as
1 For details about oil invoicing see European Central Bank (December 2005, Box 4). 2 Goldberg and Tille (2005) consider industries in Australia, Japan and the UK. 3 Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) as well as Corsetti and Dedola (2005) o¤er theoretical explanations.
with B j = j;k j;k j;l j;l j;m j;m . The optimal cost function (5) is linear in output and marginal costs therefore do not depend on the amount of output produced.
Optimal Prices
Since marginal costs are constant, a country-j …rm can maximize pro…ts with respect to each individual consumer separately without taking into account the amount sold to other consumers. Using demand function (2) and cost function (5) one can express expected pro…ts generically for any combination of h; i; j = k; l; m as
where h j;i denotes the nominal pro…ts denominated in j-currency that a country-j …rm earns by selling its good to an individual country-i consumer for the price p h j;i . The superscript h in h j;i and p h j;i indicates invoicing in h-currency. Through multiplying the price p h j;i by the exchange rate e j;h the country-j …rm converts its revenue into domestic j-currency. Through multiplying the price p h j;i by the exchange rate e i;h the country-i consumer converts the price p h j;i into country-i currency. Firms preset prices p h j;i before the exchange rates are known. When maximizing expected pro…ts, they take the exchange rate risk into account, but as monopolistic competitors they take the input prices R i , composite consumption C T i and the price index P T i as given for all i = k; l; m. Maximizing expected pro…ts (6) and solving the …rst-order condition yields the optimal price 
Firms are assumed to always invoice in domestic currency when selling to domestic consumers, i.e. they set the price p
which is a special case of the generic optimal price (7). But foreign consumers are by assumption not able to arbitrage away international price di¤erences and …rms can therefore price-discriminate across countries. Depending on which invoicing currency maximizes their expected pro…ts, …rms from country j have the option when selling in country i for j 6 = i of either producer currency pricing (PCP) by setting the price p The second relation in Figure 1 is pricing from a non-vehicle country to the vehicle country. Country-l …rms can charge country-k consumers the price p l l;k (PCP) or the price p k l;k (LCP=VCP). The third relation is pricing between the two non-vehicle countries. A country-l …rm faces three options of invoicing country-m consumers. It can set the price
The Stochastic Properties of the Exchange Rates
As one can see from the optimal price (7), various exchange rates appear multiplicatively in the expectations operator and thus, it is important to specify their stochastic properties. In order to circumvent Siegel's paradox, it is assumed that e k;l and e k;m are joint lognormally 
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For simplicity let k;l = k;m = 0. Of course, the variances are always positive ( 2 k;l > 0 and 2 k;m > 0) whereas the covariance can be negative ( l;m R 0). As a result of triangular arbitrage the relationship e l;m = e k;m =e k;l holds.
Endogenous Choice of Invoicing Currency
Firms plug the optimal prices based on (7) into expected pro…ts (6) and then compare which invoicing currency maximizes their expected pro…ts. As it will be shown, …rms' optimal invoicing decisions are generally driven by two factors -the currency denomination of costs (represented by the 's) as well as the comovement and volatility of exchange rates (represented by the 's). These factors will now be discussed in the light of the three pricing relations depicted in Figure 1 .
In general, note that all invoicing criteria that are explained in the following are independent of general equilibrium e¤ects. Since monopolistic …rms take aggregate variables including input prices as given, the optimal price (7) and subsequently the invoicing criteria would be the same in general equilibrium. A partial equilibrium set-up is therefore su¢ cient in this context to model the endogenous choice of invoicing currency.
Invoicing from the Vehicle Country to a Non-Vehicle Country
Vehicle country …rms can set either price p k k;l (PCP=VCP) or price p l k;l (LCP) when selling to country-l consumers. If expected pro…ts E h k k;l i are higher than expected pro…ts
, country-k …rms will choose PCP=VCP over LCP, and vice versa. If the expected pro…ts are equal, …rms will be indi¤erent. As it is shown in the technical appendix, this procedure leads to a necessary and su¢ cient condition for PCP=VCP to be chosen over
The invoicing decision of country-k …rms depends on the currency denomination of their costs ( k;k and k;l ) and on exchange rate properties ( l;m and 2 k;l ). Initially suppose l;m > 0 and k;l < 1=2. All else being equal the more inputs are denominated in domestic currency (i.e. the bigger k;k ), the more likely inequality (8) holds and the more likely country-k …rms price in domestic currency (PCP=VCP). Intuitively, as a basic hedging argument …rms prefer to invoice in domestic currency when a large share of their costs is denominated in domestic currency. Conversely, given l;m > 0 country-k …rms invoice in l-currency (LCP) if k;l > 1=2, i.e. when most costs are denominated in the currency of the destination country. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the invoicing decision and the shares k;k and k;l for the numerical example of l;m = 1=2 and 2 k;l = 2 k;m = 1. Apart from the currency denomination of costs, exchange rate properties also play a decisive role in determining the choice of invoicing currency. Again suppose l;m > 0 and k;l < 1=2. A more volatile exchange rate between k and l (i.e. bigger 2 k;l ) makes PCP=VCP more likely. Intuitively, bigger exchange rate volatility 2 k;l means a less stable e k;l exchange rate and by invoicing in domestic currency …rms decrease their exposure to exchange rate volatility. More formally, under PCP=VCP pro…ts k k;l are a convex function of the exchange rate e k;l due to elastic demand ( > 1) such that …rms are better o¤ by invoicing in domestic currency, an explanation that goes back to Giovannini (1988) .
Conversely, under LCP pro…ts l k;l are concave in the exchange rate e k;l . Note that apart from the elasticity requirement > 1 for consumption index (1), the invoicing criterion (8) and in fact all other invoicing criteria do not depend on any particular value of because is the same across countries.
The role of the covariance l;m is easier to understand when rewriting condition (8) as
If the exchange rates e k;l and e k;m are positively correlated (implying l;m > 0), then the currencies of countries l and m become rather similar from the country-k perspective.
Given k;l < 1=2, if the share k;m denominated in m-currency is su¢ ciently high, countryk …rms are better o¤ invoicing in l-currency, i.e. pricing in local currency. This is again a simple hedging intuition because …rms will invoice in l-currency, which is similar to m-currency, if they face a su¢ ciently big share of their costs in m-currency.
Conversely, given k;l < 1=2 when the exchange rates e k;l and e k;m are negatively correlated (implying l;m < 0), PCP is always superior to LCP. Intuitively, when kcurrency depreciates against l-currency, costs associated with inputs denominated in lcurrency are higher. But as a result of the negative correlation, at the same time kcurrency appreciates against m-currency, leading to lower costs associated with inputs denominated in m-currency. In total, the two changes tend to o¤set each other and the above argument about the convexity of expected pro…ts under PCP=VCP applies. Figure   3 illustrates the e¤ect of the covariance l;m and the share k;m on the choice of invoicing currency for the numerical example of 2 k;l = 2 k;m = 1 and k;l = k;m .
Invoicing from a Non-Vehicle Country to the Vehicle Country
The second invoicing relationship illustrated in Figure 1 is pricing from non-vehicle country l to vehicle country k. Country-l …rms can charge country-k consumers either the price p k l;k (LCP=VCP) or the price p l l;k (PCP). Comparing expected pro…ts (6) conditional on these two prices leads to the following necessary and su¢ cient condition for the choice of
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the choice of invoicing currency depending on the variables in the domestic currency denominated share l;l of costs exceeds 1=2 and is thus bigger than the other shares combined, then country-l …rms choose to invoice in domestic currency (PCP). In addition, a bigger 2 k;l makes LCP=VCP more likely. When the e k;l exchange rate is volatile relative to e k;m and thus 2 k;l tends to be big relative to 2 k;m , then due to triangular arbitrage exchange rate volatility between countries l and m also tends to be big. Domestic l-currency is therefore more volatile than k-currency and country-l …rms …nd it more attractive to invoice in k-currency. 5 Intuitively, …rms try to avoid invoicing in currencies that are unstable because it unnecessarily exposes them to exchange rate risk.
If l;l < 1=2 but l;m < 0, then LCP=VCP is chosen. Intuitively, negative covariation between e k;l and e k;m means that e l;k and e l;m are positively correlated due to triangular arbitrage, i.e. from the perspective of country-l …rms, the currencies of countries k and m tend to move in the same direction. 6 Given that the cost share l;l denominated in domestic currency constitutes less than half of total costs, country-l …rms are therefore better o¤ pricing in k-currency in order to hedge exchange rate risk (see Figure 5 for a numerical example).
As will be explained in Section 3, empirical data are available to test condition (9).
Its testable implications can therefore be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose …rms from non-vehicle country l invoice customers from vehicle country k. If the share l;l of costs denominated in the currency of country l is below 1=2, then invoicing in vehicle currency becomes more likely for (a) a bigger share l;k of costs denominated in vehicle currency and for (b) a smaller ratio l;m = 2 k;l of the exchange rate comovement with the currency of country m and the variance of the exchange rate between countries k and l. If in addition the ratio l;m = 2 k;l is below 1, then invoicing in vehicle currency becomes more likely for (c) a smaller share l;l of costs denominated in the currency of country l.
Invoicing between Non-Vehicle Countries
The range of possible invoicing choices is biggest between non-vehicle countries. A countryl …rm faces the three options of p k l;m (VCP), p m l;m (LCP) or p l l;m (PCP) when invoicing country-m consumers. Again, examining expected pro…ts conditional on these three prices leads to the following pairwise comparisons. A necessary condition for VCP to be chosen 5 Given the lognormal distribution in Section 2.2.3, it can be shown that V ar(e k;l ) = V ar(e l;k ) = exp( over PCP is 7
which is the same as condition (9). For VCP to be chosen over LCP it is necessary that
Note that condition (11) is similar to condition (10) but with l;m taking the place of l;l .
In addition, the volatility 2 k;m of the exchange rate between vehicle country k and the destination country m matters now.
Finally, a necessary condition for LCP to be chosen over PCP is
If l;l < 1=2 and l;m < 1=2 and if l;m is su¢ ciently close to zero, then condition (12) is more likely to hold in favor of LCP in case of a big foreign currency denominated share l;m of costs, whereas it is more likely to hold in favor of PCP for a big domestic currency denominated share l;l .
Perhaps the -variables in (12) can best be understood when considering the variance of the exchange rate between countries l and m. It is given by V ar(e l;m ) = V ar(e m;l ) = exp( 2 k;l 2 l;m + 2 k;m ) exp( 2 k;l 2 l;m + 2 k;m ) 1 . In contrast, the variance V ar(e k;l ) = V ar(e l;k ) of the exchange rate between countries l and k is a function of 2 k;l only and likewise, the variance V ar(e k;m ) = V ar(e m;k ) is a function of 2 k;m only. 8 If 2 k;l goes up, this increases V ar(e l;m ) and V ar(e l;k ) and thus makes l-currency more volatile relative to m-currency. Firms therefore try to avoid pricing in l-currency and LCP (i.e. pricing in m-currency) becomes more likely. If 2 k;m goes up, this increases V ar(e l;m ) and V ar(e k;m ) and thus makes m-currency more volatile relative to l-currency. If l;l in (12) is su¢ ciently high compared to l;m , then …rms will try to avoid m-currency and PCP (i.e. pricing in l-currency) becomes more likely.
But if l;m goes up, this decreases V ar(e l;m ) only and the volatility of l-currency relative to m-currency is not a¤ected. A change in l;m therefore does not matter with respect to volatility but rather with respect to hedging. If l;m is negative, this implies that from the country-l perspective the currencies of countries k and m tend to move in the same direction such that LCP (i.e. pricing in m-currency) is optimal for su¢ ciently 7 As opposed to condition (9), condition (10) is no longer su¢ cient for choosing VCP because LCP is now a distinct third alternative. In the context of condition (9) LCP is the same as VCP.
8 V ar(e k;l ) = V ar(e l;k ) = exp( (12)). Conversely, if l;m is negative, PCP is optimal for su¢ ciently high l;l and thus, an increase in l;m makes LCP more likely if l;l > l;m in (12).
As will be explained in Section 3, empirical data are available to test condition (12).
Proposition 2 Suppose …rms from non-vehicle country l invoice customers from nonvehicle country m. If the share l;l of costs denominated in the currency of country l is below 1=2 and if the share l;m of costs denominated in the currency of country m is below 1=2, then invoicing in local currency (i.e. in the currency of country m) becomes more likely for (a) a bigger ratio 2 k;l = 2 k;m of exchange rate variances. If in addition l;m = 2 k;m < 1, the invoicing in local currency becomes more likely for (b) a bigger share l;m of costs; if l;m = 2 k;m < 2 k;l = 2 k;m , then invoicing in local currency becomes more likely for (c) a smaller share l;l of costs; if l;l > l;m , then invoicing in local currency becomes more likely for (d) a bigger ratio l;m = 2 k;m of the exchange rate comovement and the variance of the exchange rate between vehicle country k and importing country m. If both l;l and l;m are su¢ ciently small and thus l;k is su¢ ciently big, then country-l …rms tend to choose VCP.
Moreover, if l;m < 0 as in Figure 7 , then VCP is the optimal choice for a wider set of parameters because a negative covariance l;m implies that e l;k and e l;m are positively correlated and that from the perspective of country-l …rms, the currencies of countries k and m tend to move in the same direction. Similarly, Figure 8 illustrates for the numerical 9 See footnote 6. example of l;k = l;m that for su¢ ciently high l;k VCP is more prevalent when e l;k and e l;m are positively correlated (i.e. l;m < 0).
Summary of the Invoicing Conditions
The invoicing decisions encapsulated in conditions (8)-(12) are all driven by the desire of …rms to hedge their costs but also by their desire to avoid exchange rate volatility. If …rms face a big fraction of their costs in a particular currency, they can hedge their costs by invoicing in that currency. If that currency is highly correlated with another currency, those two currencies tend to be substitutes. But …rms also try to avoid exchange rate volatility. A con ‡ict arises if …rms face a large fraction of their costs in a certain currency and would therefore like to invoice in that currency, but that currency happens to be especially volatile. It then depends on parameter values which motive prevails.
Aggregation of Invoicing Decisions
Empirical invoicing data are typically available as invoicing currency shares of total exports for a particular country and year. 10 For example, in 2001 the UK invoiced 29 percent of its total exports in U.S. dollars. In the same year 16 percent of total UK exports were sent to the U.S. such that the ratio of invoicing currency share and export share is 29=16 in this particular case. Given this format of available data, in order to empirically test the model of Sections 2.1-2.3 it becomes necessary to establish the theoretical invoicing currency shares arising under the distinct options of PCP, LCP and VCP. 1 0 Invoicing data relating to imports are less frequent and will therefore not be considered.
For any h let inv h j denote the invoicing currency share of currency h as a fraction of all exports from country j (29 percent in the example). Moreover, let exp j;i denote exports from j to i and let exp j be total exports from country j. The country-i export share as a fraction of total country-j exports is thus given by exp j;i =exp j . In the above example when j is the UK and i is the U.S., this share is 16 percent. Now the ratio of invoicing currency share over export share with respect to h-currency can be de…ned as invexp h j;i inv h j exp j;i =exp j for j 6 = i (29=16 in the example). Note that given the available data, invexp h j;i can be computed for h = i (as in the example) and usually also for h = j. But when the invoicing currency is neither the exporter's nor the importer's currency (i.e. for h 6 = j; i), the ratio invexp h j;i is typically unknown.
Invoicing from the Vehicle Country
As all …rms within one country are symmetric, the aggregate invoicing share can be obtained without di¢ culty. When selling to foreign consumers, vehicle country-k …rms can invoice in either domestic (i.e. vehicle) or foreign currency. Under VCP=PCP to all foreign customers the invoicing share of the vehicle currency is inv k k = 1 and the invoicing share of the foreign currency is inv i k = 0. When country-k …rms invoice in foreign local currency under LCP, the inv i k share corresponds to the export share inv i k = exp k;i =exp k and the invoicing share of the vehicle currency is inv k k = 0. The invoicing/export ratios therefore follow as
The ratio invexp i k;i for invoicing in non-vehicle currency i is therefore bounded by 0 under VCP=PCP and 1 under LCP.
Invoicing from a Non-Vehicle Country
For exports from a non-vehicle country j = l; m, the invoicing currency shares of the vehicle currency are inv k j = 0 under PCP, inv k j = exp j;k =exp j under LCP and inv k j = 1 under VCP such that the corresponding invoicing/export ratios invexp k j;k for the vehicle currency are given by invexp k j;k = 0 for j = l; m under PCP invexp k j;k = 1 for j = l; m under LCP invexp k j;k = exp j =exp j;k > 1 for j = l; m under VCP invexp k j;k > 1 is therefore a necessary and su¢ cient condition for VCP by a non-vehicle country …rm. The invoicing behavior of UK exporters to the U.S. falls into this category.
As invexp k j;k under VCP is bounded by 1 at the lower end but unbounded from above, it is referred to in Section 3 as the extent of VCP. Table 1 ).
In total, the observations involve ten currencies. Apart from the U.S. dollar and the euro the data report invoicing in the Canadian dollar, pound sterling, the Deutschmark, 1 1 As a rather contrived scenario, VCP could also occur with invexp k j;k < 1 if …rms from a non-vehicle country did VCP with respect to other non-vehicle countries but PCP with respect to the vehicle country. In the theory developed in Sections 2.1-2.3, however, this scenario cannot arise since conditions (9) and (10) are the same. It will therefore be ignored since it would re ‡ect non-optimal pricing. the Swiss franc, the Swedish krona, Japanese yen, the New Zealand dollar and the Singapore dollar. The years of observation vary between 1996 and 2004. The data appendix gives the precise data sources.
Output Shares and Export Shares
The weights in the production function (3) represent the shares of the currency denomination of …rms' costs. In order to test the model, a breakdown of …rms' costs into currencies would be ideal as -regressors but such data are not available, certainly not as macroeconomic data. Instead, I will suggest two alternative measures that are consistent with the model presented in Section 2.
Assume that the continuum [0; 1] encompasses all input factors in the world. Similar to the continuum of …nal goods, the range [0; n k ] of inputs is associated with country k, the range [n k ; n l ] with country l and the range [n l ; n m ] with country m. To allow for the possibility of nontradable inputs such as internationally immobile labor, assume that for each country h = k; l; m the share s h of inputs is tradable such that [n h 1 ; n h 1 + s h (n h n h 1 )] represents the range of all tradable inputs from country h with n k 1 = 0, n l 1 = n k and n m 1 = n l .
The …rst measure of the 's can be motivated by assuming a perfect world without trade frictions in which all inputs are tradable such that s h = 1 for h = k; l; m. In this case the 's simply follow as relative country sizes and for the empirical analysis, j;h will be taken as the country-h share of world output for j; h = k; l; m.
In contrast, the second measure of the 's arises in a world with trade frictions where some inputs are nontradable and thus only available to domestic …rms such that from the perspective of country j, s j = 1 but 0 s h 1 for h 6 = j. The input range
[n h 1 ; n h 1 + s h (n h n h 1 )] will now be proxied by total exports of country h 6 = j and the range [n j 1 ; n j ] will be interpreted as output of country j. The whole range of inputs available to country-j …rms is therefore given by total exports in the world plus country-j output. For the empirical analysis j;h then follows as the ratio of total country-h exports over total exports in the world plus country-j output and j;j follows as the ratio of country-j output over total exports in the world plus country-j output.
To summarize, if there are no trade frictions, the j;h 's are determined by output shares and are the same for all j = k; l; m. In the presence of nontradable inputs the j;h 's are represented by export shares and generally di¤er across j = k; l; m. The empirical j;h 's are computed using data from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) as well as data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Details can be found in the data appendix.
Explaining the Extent of Vehicle Currency Pricing
From Section 2.4.2 it follows that an invoicing/export ratio bigger than one (invexp k j;k > 1) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for VCP by …rms from non-vehicle currency country j 6 = k. 36 out of the 56 observations ful…ll this condition. Since invexp k j;k under VCP has a lower bound of 1 but is unbounded from above, it is referred to as the extent of VCP.
As might be expected, virtually all of the 36 VCP observations have the U.S. dollar or the euro as invoicing currencies, meaning that vehicle currency use can be associated almost exclusively with these two currencies. The extent of VCP is considerably higher for the U.S. dollar, the average invoicing/export ratio being 6:5. The biggest value is in fact 19:9 for Cyprus. In contrast, the average invoicing/export ratio for pricing in euros is only 1:4 with no single value exceeding 2. Two observations associate VCP with the Deutschmark for the year 1996, i.e. before the introduction of the euro. The only surprise is one observation that associates VCP with the Swedish krona for exports from Bulgaria.
Firms from non-vehicle country l can use the vehicle currency as invoicing currency both when selling to customers from vehicle country k and when selling to customers from the other non-vehicle country m. The model's corresponding theoretical predictions stem from condition (9) for selling to vehicle country k and from conditions (10) and (11) for selling to non-vehicle country m. But as explained in Section 2.4, invexp k l;m is typically unknown so that the distinction between selling to the vehicle country as opposed to selling to a non-vehicle country cannot be made. For the empirical analysis I will therefore focus on conditions (9) and (10), which are the same, because this VCP condition applies to both selling to vehicle country customers (as a necessary and su¢ cient condition) and selling to non-vehicle country customers (as a necessary condition).
Proposition 1 summarizes the model's predictions about the extent of VCP (invexp k l;k ). As the model assumes symmetry amongst all …rms within one country, for given values of relevant regressors it yields the extreme prediction of either no or total VCP in the aggregate. In practice, of course, …rms are heterogeneous and for given regressor values, one would expect a more diverse aggregate outcome. The share l;l in condition (9) is below 1=2 for all output share and export share observations in the sample. As implied by Proposition 1, one would expect a positive coe¢ cient for l;k and a negative coe¢ cient for l;m = 2 k;l in a regression of the invoicing/export ratio invexp k l;k . 12 For the share l;l one would expect a negative coe¢ cient because the requirement l;m = 2 k;l < 1 is met for the mean of l;m = 2 k;l (= 0:68) and for 31 out of the 36 single observations. Note that while l;m is a clear-cut variable in the three-country model, its interpretation is more di¢ cult for the empirical analysis. In a multi-country world, m represents the rest of the world with a range of currencies. In order to re ‡ect the use of various cur- The Heckman procedure uses FIML. t-statistics given in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
rencies, m is interpreted as an entity that uses the IMF's Special Drawing Right (SDR) as a currency. The SDR is a basket of the world's major currencies currently containing the U.S. dollar (45 percent), the euro (29 percent), Japanese yen (15 percent) and pound sterling (11 percent). Although not perfect, the SDR still serves as a suitable benchmark for an assessment of the exchange rate properties of the currencies of countries k and l.
More generally, if the model is extended to multiple countries, the qualitative e¤ects of the 's do not change. Intuitively, an additional currency will merely reinforce the importance of exchange rates whose properties with respect to the vehicle currency are similar to its own, but it will not create qualitatively new insights. Table 1 reports regression results for the extent of VCP. l;k is referred to as the vehicle country share and l;l is referred to as the exporter's share. 13 The …rst pair of columns uses -regressors based on output shares and the remaining columns use -regressors based on export shares, as explained in Section 3.2.
When output shares are used, all regressors have the expected signs and are signi…cant.
In addition to an OLS regression, a Heckman sample selection procedure is estimated as a robustness check controlling for the fact that only observations are considered for which the invoicing/export ratio invexp k l;k is greater than 1. Apart from the regressors of the regression equation, the selection equation also includes a dummy variable that indicates whether the U.S. is a destination country since the U.S. dollar is a likely vehicle currency candidate. The Heckman estimation procedure yields similar results.
When export shares are used in otherwise the same regressions, the currency comovement coe¢ cient has the correct sign but is no longer signi…cant. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of the vehicle country share l;k has the wrong sign but is insigni…cant. The reason for the wrong sign appears to be the fact that given its size, the eurozone is a relatively open economic entity that exports disproportionately many goods.
Indeed, if a dummy variable indicating whether the eurozone is a destination country is included (see the last pair of columns), the coe¢ cient of the vehicle country share has the correct sign and is signi…cant in the OLS regression. 14 The currency comovement variable is signi…cant, too, and the R 2 of the OLS regression is raised to roughly the same level as in the output share regression, con…rming the importance of the underlying heterogeneity.
The …nding that the dummy itself has a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient might be related to the fact that the euro as a young currency is not entirely established yet and that invoicing in euros is expected to rise. Time-series evidence reported by the European Central Bank (2005) in fact shows that the use of the euro as an invoicing currency has continually risen since 2000.
Further robustness checks, albeit unreported here, corroborate the results of Table   1 . Almost half of the 36 observations involve the ten new Eastern EU member states as exporters and thus the sample might not be representative. But including a dummy variable as a …xed e¤ect for those countries hardly alters the results. Furthermore, the sample includes Estonia and Bulgaria which peg their currencies against the euro. Adding a suitable dummy or removing those observations from the sample does not have any substantial e¤ect on the results.
In conclusion, Table 1 con…rms the predictions for the extent of VCP that emanate from the model developed in Section 2. In particular, currency comovements appear to be an important determinant for the decision to invoice in vehicle currency. Note that in the output share regressions, the absolute magnitude of coe¢ cients is higher for the exporter's share l;l than for the vehicle country share l;k (i.e. the importer's share). This result indicates that the economic strength of the exporting country has a stronger impact on the extent of VCP than the economic strength of the destination country. It is consistent with Grassman's (1973) well-known …nding that among developed countries exports of manufactured goods are more often invoiced in domestic currency than imports.
Explaining the Fraction of Local Currency Pricing
The aggregation in Section 2.4.2 shows that the invoicing/export ratio invexp m l;m for invoicing from non-vehicle country l to non-vehicle country m is bounded by 0 in the case of PCP and 1 in the case of LCP. The ratio invexp m l;m is therefore referred to as the fraction of LCP and Proposition 2 provides the relevant theoretical predictions. 20 out of the 56 observed invoicing/export ratios lie in between 0 and 1. 15 No single l;m or l;l observation in the sample is larger than 1=2. According to Proposition 2 one would therefore expect a positive coe¢ cient for 2 k;l = 2 k;m in a regression of the invoicing/export ratio invexp m l;m . As the requirement l;m = 2 k;m < 1 is met for the mean of l;m = 2 k;m (= 0:61) and for 13 out of the 20 single observations, one would expect a positive coe¢ cient for the importer's share l;m . For the exporter's share l;l one would expect a negative coe¢ cient because the requirement l;m = 2 k;m < 2 k;l = 2 k;m is met for the mean and for 14 out of the 20 individual observations. 16 For the coe¢ cient of l;m = 2 k;m the expected sign depends on the relative sizes of l;l and l;m . As for the majority of observations l;l is smaller than l;m , one might expect a negative coe¢ cient. The U.S. dollar is now regarded as the vehicle currency k because it is used considerably more than any other vehicle currency identi…ed in Section 3.3. Table 2 reports regression results for the fraction of LCP. The …rst pair of columns uses -regressors based on output shares and the second pair of columns uses -regressors based on export shares. The Heckman sample selection procedure controls for the fact that observations are only included in the regressions if the invoicing/export ratio invexp m l;m is smaller than 1. Apart from the regressors of the regression equation, the selection equation includes a dummy indicating whether the U.S. is a destination country. This dummy takes into account that exporting to the U.S. typically results in the use of the U.S. dollar as invoicing currency and thus in an invoicing/export ratio that is greater than 1.
All -coe¢ cients have the expected signs and are signi…cant. Again note that in the output share regressions, the coe¢ cient of the exporter's share l;l is bigger in absolute magnitude than the coe¢ cient of the importer's share l;m , consistent with Grassman's (1973) …nding.
In contrast, the -regressors are not signi…cant. The relative variance 2 k;l = 2 k;m has the expected sign but the currency comovement l;m = 2 k;m does not. The latter …nding might arise because the requirement l;l < l;m for l;m = 2 k;m to have a negative coe¢ cient is not very clearly met. In addition, as pointed out by the European Central Bank (2005), 1 5 None of those 20 observations are associated with exporters that are vehicle countries as identi…ed in Section 3.3 such that the invoicing/export ratio invexp i k;i for i = l; m from Section 2.4.1 does not apply. Invoicing data for exports from eurozone countries are not available for non-vehicle currencies. Invoicing data for exports from the U.S. are not available at all. 1 6 l;k cannot be included as a regressor because it would be collinear with l;m and l;l due to the assumption of constant returns to scale. Exporter's share ( l;l ) 6:22 The Heckman procedure uses FIML. t-statistics given in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate signi…cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
the invoicing data might be noisy inasmuch as some observations refer to the currency of settlement rather than the currency of invoicing. These results hold up if the regressions are based on two alternative sets of -regressors. The …rst set is computed on the basis of detrended exchange rate series in order to …lter out secular exchange rate trends. The second set is computed on the basis of exchange rates series that cover a longer time window. 17 Furthermore, the …ndings of Table 2 do not change qualitatively if dummy variables are added for Eastern EU members as well as for Estonia and Bulgaria, which peg their currencies against the euro. The …ndings do not change either if these observations are dropped.
In summary, the results of Table 2 do not point to a prominent role of exchange rate variances and comovements in determining the choice of invoicing currency in the case of local currency pricing. But given the low number of observations and given that the estimated -coe¢ cients are small, a de…nite conclusion can hardly be drawn. In fact, the emphasis on the currency denomination of inputs can potentially also explain why invoicing involving the U.S. is qualitatively di¤erent from invoicing that does not involve the U.S. As documented, for instance, by Mann (1986) and Knetter (1989 and 1993) , U.S. exporters follow PCP signi…cantly more than non-U.S. exporters, and importers to the U.S. follow LCP signi…cantly more than importers to other countries. 
Questions for Future Research
Data on invoicing are still rare to …nd. The empirical literature so far has naturally focused on invoicing in vehicle currency because of better data availability. But we still hardly know for which type of trading partner countries invoice in vehicle currency. Japan is currently one of the very few countries to provide at least a rough breakdown of vehicle currency use into destination countries and regions. Apart from invoicing in vehicle currency, it is also important to collect more observations on invoicing in non-vehicle currencies.
In addition, there is a need for industry-speci…c data on invoicing behavior. Goldberg and Tille (2005) 
Conclusion
The choice of invoicing currency is fundamental for the international transmission of macroeconomic policy and it is therefore essential to understand the factors that drive the choice of invoicing currency. This paper develops a three-country model of monopolistic competition in which …rms preset prices under exchange rate risk. They can invoice either in producer currency, in local currency or in a third vehicle currency and endogenously choose the invoicing currency that maximizes their expected pro…ts. The model is partial equilibrium but the same invoicing decisions would arise in a general equilibrium framework since the monopolistic …rms take aggregate variables as given.
The key feature of the model is that …rms face some of their production costs in foreign currency, an assumption which is consistent with the empirical evidence of the high passthrough of nominal exchange rates to import and wholesale prices. A forthright hedging intuition arises in that whenever a …rm faces a high proportion of its costs denominated in a particular currency, it has an incentive to invoice in that currency.
In addition to the hedging intuition, invoicing decisions are also driven by exchange rate characteristics. Furthermore, the model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that encompasses 24 reporting countries and ten invoicing currencies. Vehicle currency pricing is distinguished from local currency pricing using a criterion based on the model. The results con…rm the importance of currency comovements for the decision to invoice in vehicle currency. The …ndings also imply that if the U.S. share of world output continues to fall, other currencies will increasingly replace the U.S. dollar as an international vehicle currency.
Technical Appendix
In order to derive cost function (5), solve the production function (3) for the individual input factor N j;m and plug the solution into cost function (4). Then take the derivative with respect to N j;k , set the derivative to zero and solve for N j;k to obtain a …rst-order condition for N j;k . Repeat this last procedure for N j;l to obtain a …rst-order condition for N j;l . Combine the …rst-order conditions to obtain the optimal input demand functions 
A …rst-order condition for N j;m can be derived by …rst solving the production function (3) for the individual input factor N j;k and then following the above steps analogously. The resulting optimal input demand function is
Finally, plug (13)- (15) into (4) and make use of the assumption of constant returns to scale ( j;k + j;l + j;m = 1) to yield cost function (5).
In order to derive invoicing condition (8), set h = j = k and i = l in the generic expected pro…ts (6) and in the generic optimal price (7) to obtain E rearranging yields
To solve inequality (18) 
A good introduction to lognormal distributions is provided by Kleiber and Kotz (2003, Chapter 4) . Apply the moment-generating function (19) to inequality (18) and take natural logarithms to obtain
(1 )
As stated in Section 2.3.3, for the case of 2 k;l > l;m > 0 and 2 k;m > l;m > 0 particularly simple su¢ cient invoicing conditions can be derived for pricing between nonvehicle countries. In this case l;k > 1=2 is a su¢ cient condition for VCP. In order to derive this result, use l;k + l;l + l;m = 1 to rewrite invoicing conditions (10) and (11) Table 1) give an overview of data availability.
The UK invoicing data are taken from the currency of invoicing press release by HM The raw exchange rate data are taken from the IMF IFS through http://www.esds.
ac.uk/, using the monthly end of period market exchange rate series (line ..AE.ZF). For each invoicing observation the exchange rate variances and covariances are computed by considering exchange rate data for the …ve years prior to the observation year and for the observation year itself, i.e. for six years in total. For a number of variances and covariances involving the euro the calculations have to be based on time series of less than six years because the euro was only launched in 1999. The exchange rate variances and covariances are computed in line with the assumption of the joint lognormal distribution in Section 2.2.3 in that the natural logarithm of the exchange rate series is taken and their means are subtracted, consistent with the assumption k;l = k;m = 0. The -variances and covariances are then computed with the demeaned logarithmic series.
As a robustness check of the results reported in Table 2 , two alternative sets ofregressors are used. The …rst set is based on variances and covariances that are computed with the demeaned logarithmic values of detrended exchange rate series. As a simple linear detrending method, the linear trend between the …rst and the last observations is deducted from the individual observations of each exchange rate series so that the …rst and last values of the resulting series are equal. The second set is based on variances and covariances that are computed by considering exchange rate data for the ten years prior to the observation year and for the observation year itself, i.e. for eleven years in total.
Exchange rate data for the European Currency Unit (ECU) are used as euro observations prior to 1999, provided by the Federal Reserve Economic Data database (FRED) at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/. These data report monthly averages of daily …gures as opposed to end of period observations.
